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Britain's Iraq intelligence 'seriously flawed' An official inquiry into the quality of British intelligence on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction said Wednesday that some sources were 鈥渟eriously flawed鈥� or 鈥渦nreliable鈥� but found no evidence of 鈥渄eliberate distortion or culpable negligence.鈥�
Lord Butler said, however, that a key prewar dossier prepared by Prime Minister Tony Blair鈥檚 government on the threat posed by Saddam Hussein pushed the government case to the limits of available intelligence.
He found that vital qualifying information on the limits of available intelligence were left out of the September 2002 dossier. Butler鈥檚 report contradicted a central claim made by Blair and found that, before the start of the war in March 2003, Iraq 鈥渄id not have significant, if any, stocks of chemical or biological weapons in a state fit for deployment or developed plans for using them.鈥� The report comes after U.S. Senate committee said last week that most of the Central Intelligence Agency鈥檚 claims on Saddam Hussein鈥檚 alleged arsenal were overstated or unsupported. The committee chairman, noting that the United States was not alone in its beliefs, called it a 鈥済lobal intelligence failure.鈥� Blair鈥檚 political opponents had hoped the Butler report would endorse their view that his government pressured spy chiefs into hyping the threat posed by Saddam. 鈥淭ony Blair should admit that he was wrong about the size, scope and capacity of Iraq鈥檚 WMD arsenal,鈥� said Charles Kennedy, leader of the opposition Liberal Democrat Party on Tuesday. 鈥淚t鈥檚 time he acknowledged his mistakes and took the blame.鈥� Blair in a bullish mood
The prime minister鈥檚 personal ratings have fallen in the aftermath of the divisive war, and newspapers constantly speculate about the end of his run in power. But he remains in a strong position. A recent poll asked whether respondents would rather have Blair or opposition Conservative leader Michael Howard as prime minister, and Blair was favored by 47 percent to 31 percent. Blair set out his case for war in a September 2002 dossier on Iraq鈥檚 illicit weapons programs. In it, Blair confidently asserted that the intelligence 鈥渆stablished beyond doubt ... that Saddam continued to produce chemical and biological weapons, that he continues in his efforts to develop nuclear weapons.鈥� The dossier claimed Saddam had stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons; could deploy some within 45 minutes; and was trying to buy uranium in Africa to develop nuclear weapons. Since the fall of Baghdad, however, the Iraqi Survey Group has found no stocks of WMD. The U.N. nuclear watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency, said documents supporting the uranium claim were forgeries and there was no evidence of a resurgent nuclear program.
The 45-minute claim, mentioned four times in the dossier, has caused the government the most trouble. In May 2003, the British Broadcasting Corp. claimed Blair鈥檚 office had 鈥渟exed up鈥� the dossier by inserting the detail against the wishes of spy chiefs and probably knew it was wrong. In the course of battle between the government and the broadcaster, weapons scientist David Kelly, named as the BBC鈥檚 source, committed suicide. Two parliamentary committees 鈥� the Foreign Affairs Select Committee and the Intelligence and Security Committee 鈥� cleared the government of 鈥渟exing up鈥� the dossier. Both said the 鈥渏ury was still out鈥� on the existence of WMD in Iraq. The second report said vital caveats on the limits of British intelligence had been left out and it should have made clear the 45-minute claim referred to short-range battlefield munitions, not missiles.
Allawi insisted Saddam was developing long-range weapons and had shown he was ready to use chemical and biological weapons. 鈥淣obody could really say whether he was able to develop it completely,鈥� he told BBC radio. Support from Bill Clinton Blair received some supportive words Wednesday from former President Bill Clinton, who said Britons needed to remember that 鈥渋t was very difficult in the aftermath of 9/11 for any world leader not to act on his intelligence.鈥� 鈥淎nd the British intelligence, whatever Lord Butler says about it, was clearly even more forward-leading than the American intelligence in believing that Saddam (Hussein) was trying to get nuclear materials, in believing that Saddam had some kind of relationship with al-Qaida,鈥� Clinton told British Broadcasting Corp. radio. Lord Hutton鈥檚 inquiry into Kelly鈥檚 suicide investigated deepest into the workings of the government and its intelligence agencies. In his report, derided by many as a 鈥渨hitewash,鈥� Hutton concluded Blair鈥檚 government had not misused intelligence. But, Hutton suggested that intelligence officials may have been sensitive to what they perceived as their government鈥檚 determination to go to war. He concluded that John Scarlett, chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee who signed off on the dossier, may have been 鈥渟ubconsciously influenced鈥� by Blair鈥檚 desire for strong evidence on WMD. |
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